Introduction: Although patient safety has improved steadily, harm remains a substantial
Harm from medical care continues to impose a substantial global burden.
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The systematic study of patient safety, even in hospitals, is recent. Current strategies on patient safety are generally process driven and hospital based, and not person centred across the life span. 6 Hospital stays have steadily decreased for both medical conditions and after surgical procedures; simultaneously and increasingly, complex care is now being provided on an out-patient basis. 4, [7] [8] [9] Gaps in the continuity of care are an important cause of morbidity and mortality. 6 Therefore, systematic studies of patient safety and quality of care measures should now also focus on care provided outside hospitals. 6, 8 The 2015 "Free from Harm" report highlighted the progress that had been made in minimizing harm; at the same time, the authors drew attention to the complexities underlying errors that remained unaddressed and made several recommendations to rectify deficiencies. 8, 9 Those pertinent to our analysis are (1) a systems approach that would require "active involvement of every player (italics ours) in the health care system," (2) coordination and collaboration "across organizations," (3) promoting "safety culture," and (4) ensuring safety not just in hospitals but across the entire continuum of care including long-term facilities and patients' homes. 6, 8 The cognitive roots of decision making and diagnostic errors have also been targeted for attention. 1, [10] [11] [12] These suggestions echo many of those made earlier by
Reason. [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] A conceptual framework to implement them successfully is urgently needed because fiscal and ideological challenges to privately and publicly funded health care in many countries [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] may not only derail improvement but also enhance the risk of error.
In February 2017, Sir Robert Francis QC warned that the National Health Service (NHS, United Kingdom) was facing an "existential 
| METHODS
This thematic analysis 27 is in part an overview of earlier reviews. 25, 26, 28 Additionally, previously described strategies 28 were used to update references and also retrieve articles on patient safety and the Swiss cheese model (SCM). The search was restricted to the English language. The potential for selection bias in the references chosen for inclusion is acknowledged.
| Use of terms and quotation marks
Words and sentences quoted verbatim to avoid the bias of paraphrasing are placed in "double" quotation marks. Italics are used, generally the first time, words or terms with ambiguous meanings are used in a specific context. Thus, Reason is only used as a proper noun.
Unless, otherwise specified, health care encompasses that of both the individual and population across the continuum of care. Diagnoses and complex health care decisions are now being made or influenced by professionals other than doctors, and provision of health care is a multidisciplinary effort. Therefore, professionals refer to health care practitioners, allied health care professionals, and health care administrators. In the present context, individuals refer not only to professionals but also to all others who have the potential to influence patient safety; examples of the latter include politicians and persons associated with agencies regulating health care.
There are several definitions of error and many ways in which errors can be classified; Reason also distinguished between errors and violations while incorporating both under "unsafe acts." 14, 18 In this his concepts, including those pertinent to the SCM (Figure 1 ), over the next 40 years. [13] [14] [15] 17, 18, [29] [30] [31] [32] He suggested that the knowledge gained from the study of industrial practices and accidents could be adapted to health care. 14 At the same time, he warned that health care was far more complex than any industry, the complexity enhancing the potential for errors while increasing the challenges for avoiding them. 16, 32, 33 Reason's warning has been reinforced recently. 33 There have been several criticisms of the SCM: (1) too simplistic, (2) nonspecific without explicit definitions for the slices and holes, (3) static portrait of complex systems, (4) potentially open to differing interpretations, and (5) focusing unduly on systemic and organizational factors rather than on the errors of individuals. 31, [34] [35] [36] [37] Reason cautioned that the model was a "symbolic simplification that should not be taken literally" and emphasized that the SCM was a generic tool meant to be custom tailored to specific situations 18, 31 ; an example of such use is shown in Figure 2 . 38 He also acknowledged that the SCM was only one of many for studying "accidents." The SCM has been used in a variety of medical settings 17, 18, 31, 35, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] and has also been the basis for other models of "incident causation." 31, 36 
| The systems approach
A systems approach requires not only an assessment of the culture, policies, and all the individual components of an organization but also the external influences on them. 15 Reason suggested that many errors committed by individuals had their roots in such "upstream" influences. 18 Automation, an increasing component of all systems including health care, may simplify tasks but also add to the complexity of problem-solving and cognitive burden when something goes wrong. 14, 18, 29 Highly reliable and resilient organizations focus on the entire system, support the workforce, and facilitate a culture of "intelligent wariness." 15 Health care professionals are generally considered to be the last line of defence in the health care system. 16, 18, 36 Reason warned that the person-focused approach alone "has serious shortcomings and is ill suited" to medical errors, arguing that "the pursuit of greater safety is seriously impeded" if the "error provoking properties within the system at large" were not addressed 15 : The "Free from Harm" document confirms that effective systems methods have not been adopted by many health care influencing organizations. : Discontinuity of care is a risk to patient safety. 6 Additionally, several organizations influence the quality of evidence that informs person-centred health care 25, 26, 28 :
Quality of evidence and the applicability to the individual are also important determinants of patient safety. 25, 26, 28, [48] [49] [50] Any listing or discussion of all the possible organizations influencing patient safety is beyond the scope of this paper and will be the subject of a separate one. In the present context, organization is a functional concept referring to an association of people with a shared culture: Goals, vision, views, and/or mission; subcultures can exist within teams and departments of large organizations. Individuals in an organization may or may not be employees, and frequently, there is a hierarchy of influence and/or authority ( Figure 3) . 25, 26, 28, 51 Organizational cultures can be healthy or unhealthy. 29, [51] [52] [53] Organizations, teams, and professionals can have a positive or negative effect on patient safety, complex cognitive processes being involved. 11, 25, 26, 28, 48, 54 
| Cognition
Cognition is the seamless integration of mental processes by which the brain transforms, stores, and uses internal and external inputs. The integration is dependent upon an intricate matrix of neural networks involving not only the cerebral hemispheres but also likely the entire brain, including the cerebellum. [55] [56] [57] Functionally, cognition occurs relatively harmoniously at the unconscious and conscious levels. The former corresponds to system 1 ("thinking fast") and the latter to system 2 ("thinking slow"), ie, the dual-process system; we function mainly in the quicker more energy-efficient system 1 (autopilot) mode and do so correctly most of the time; errors likely arise from both systems, although system 1 has generally been considered to be more error-prone.
18,54,58-61 Table 1 lists some factors likely to catalyze error: Frequently, these co-occur, and all are common in health care. 7, 14, [16] [17] [18] [40] [41] [42] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] Decisions can also be influenced by a complex constellation of emotions created by workplace cultures, the nature of the task, and endogenous or exogenous psychological factors affecting health care providers. 65, 68 Chronic exposure to adverse influences can lead to gradual burnout, further compromising decision making. 68 Patient-related factors (Table 1) are also important. 69, 70 The contribution of psychological To our knowledge, Reason has not published any further revisions to the figure factors to safety is understudied and generally overlooked. 65, 68, 69 Measures to prevent and address all these factors can improve safety.
| Cognitive biases plus (+)
The term "cognitive biases plus (+)" was proposed for the following reasons 25, 26, 28 : (1) ; his concepts encompassed the notion of resiliency intrinsic to high reliability organizations, a philosophy also reflected in the safety-II paradigm. 36, 87 Our proposed model integrates current concepts in the cognitive-behavioural sciences explicitly into the SCM.
Defences against error are key in Reason's system approach; some safeguards are technological but most if not all ultimately depend on individuals. 15, 18, 29, 30 He described the cheese slices as "successive layers of defences, barriers, and safeguards" throughout the health care system. We suggest that each layer (slice) can be conceptualized Typically, several factors co-occur. These factors create holes in the Swiss cheese and/or may cause holes to align in several successive layers of defence: We refer to these phenomena as "breaching of the cognitive-affective gates" (discussed in the text). Authors' compilation from several references cited in the text. The list is not meant to be all-inclusive.
level, there may be several steps in the decision-making process of each organization, team, or individual where such gating may occur or additional gates (reinforcements) may be activated.
Reason described the holes in the Swiss cheese as "weaknesses in the defences." In the integrated model, the holes in the Swiss cheese represent breaching of the cognitive-affective gates (Figures 2 and 5 ), permitting cognitive failure; cognitive failure encompasses all varieties of individual, team, and organizational fallibility. 71 One or more elements of cognitive-affective biases plus at organizational, team, and/or individual levels are important contributors to breaches, as are the factors listed in Table 1 . Conversely, the factors listed in Table 2 reinforce cognitive-affective gates. Figure 2 is a simple example of one clinical setting illustrating factors that breach and those that strengthen cognitive-affective gates; the latter effectively close the holes in the Swiss cheese 38 and /or prevent alignment of the holes in successive layers of defence.
The integrated cognitive-affective biases plus (cascade)-gated SCM, perhaps abbreviated to the cognitive-affective-gated SCM, has analogies in cell biology and health care: Virtual gating 88 ; the gate theory of pain 89, 90 ; ion-gated channels in health and disease 91 ; and sensory, motor, and cognitive gating in Neuropsychiatry. 92 Static figures, however complex, and text explanations used in these examples, cannot fully capture the underlying dynamic complexities of the involved structures and processes.
| DISCUSSION
Like the original SCM, the cognitive-affective-gated SCM is a systems approach that attempts to explain (1) the spectrum of safety: correct decisions, near misses, minor and major adverse events; and (2) the complex interlinked roles of individuals, teams, organizational factors, Table 1 for list of error-catalyzing factors and Table 2 for ways (1) unsound decisions made at higher organizational levels or (2) dissemination of erroneous information by those with influence or in positions of authority. Slice B, breach at level of health care professionals, for example, by (1) sleep deprivation or (2) inadequate knowledge. Slice C, breach at the level of patients and caregivers, for example, by (1) suboptimal shared decision making or (2) nonadherence. Please see text for details. Figure 5 integrates the concepts underlying Figures 1, 2 , and 4, and information in Tables 1  and 2 . The boxes are convenient envelopes for the text, and their relative sizes have no other significance and cultures. Thus, the model can be applied to both the "negative"
and "positive" aspects of patient safety. 18 The latter is the focus of the safety-II model: The study of how and why things usually go right. 36, 87 The potential for adverse consequences is greater if several layers of defence are weakened or breached (the holes aligning in several layers of the Swiss cheese), upstream organizational factors generally being responsible.
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The cognitive-affective-gated SCM is also a generic tool that can be custom tailored to specific situations across the continuum of care. The health care facilities, 105 and (9) the causes of the "crisis in EBM." 48 The model may also explain adverse events during phase 1 clinical trials, 106 the industrial accidents discussed by Reason, 13, 18, 29, 30 and the disparities in health care for social disadvantaged and other groups. 69 Unhealthy organizational cultures played a pivotal role in some of the cited examples.
The consequences have far-reaching downstream effects when bad decisions are made or erroneous information disseminated by those who are influential or have authority ( Figure 5 ; breach of Swiss cheese slice A).
Unhealthy organizational cultures are not easily cured 29 :
The mishaps at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust showed nothing had changed since the inquiry into those at the Bristol Royal
Infirmary almost a decade earlier. 102 The recent "existential crisis" in the NHS lends further support. 24 Strength of evidence for the model is enhanced by synthesizing published information authored by different individuals from diverse disciplines such as anthropology, behavioural economics, business management, basic and clinical sciences (including cognitive neuroscience), critical thinking, EBM, ethics, law, patient safety, philosophy, and social sciences. 25, 26, 28 Unavoidably, the concepts underlying the model are abstract.
Like the SCM and the gate theory of pain, the integrated model is virtual (ie, a physical correlate has not been demonstrated). The supportive evidence is indirect and qualitative; additionally, the data are mainly from developed countries, although limited evidence from other countries suggests that the proposed model can be applied globally. 5, 103, 104 Nonetheless, the evidence offered is the current best available, fulfilling a fundamental principle of evidence-based medicine. 107, 108 Our views, like those of others, can be influenced by intellectual
CoI and other cognitive-affective biases plus. Readers are encouraged to critically appraise the secondary and primary references on which our analysis is based, 107, 109 and the model will need to be validated by others.
Humans may be fallible but often they do things right. 87 In addition, their timely actions have averted mishaps or mitigated the consequences of errors and technical failures; the attributes that facilitate such actions include individual and collective mindfulness. 18 More mishaps do not occur in health care, even in organizations with unhealthy cultures, because of the cognitive vigilance, "error wisdom," These factors rectify the error-catalyzing factors listed in Table 1 . These factors "gate the holes," ie, reinforce cognitive-affective gates in the system. Authors' compilation from several references cited in the text. The list is not meant to be all-inclusive.
and dedication of many in the health care workforce. The value of good organizational cultures and role models cannot be overemphasized.
Health care professionals are generally considered to be the last line of (cognitive-affective) defence in the health care system. 16, 18, 36 However, well-informed patients and caregivers can serve this role:
They are the only constants in the continuum of care and potentially represent the most important defensive layer (Swiss cheese slice C in Figure 5 ). Shared decision making, the centrepiece of person-centred health care, is no longer an option but a mandatory element of quality of care. The integrated cognitive-affective-gated SCM is a logical extension of his ideas and our paper a tribute to his contributions and prescience.
The cognitive-affective-gated SCM may help us appreciate the complexities of cognitive-affective processes that influence correct and erroneous decisions and actions. The model is based on a systems approach and can be applied to all health care-related disciplines, professionals, and organizations. Thus, the model offers a conceptual framework for the proposed steps to improve patient safety across the spectrum of care globally. 1, 8, 10, 11 However, one model may not fully explain all adverse events, and models must be improved continuously as knowledge advances and the landscape of health care changes; often, as one problem is resolved, "others spring up in its place" 18, 26, 30, 31 : Patient safety is a continuously moving target. 113 Complex problems require thoughtful and multifaceted responses. Therefore, multipronged system-based approaches are needed to enhance patient safety across the continuum of care, and the integrated model provides an evidence-informed framework to evaluate strategies that may result in improvement. Reason's suggestions and those of others, including the roles of mindfulness and cognitive debiasing and strategic reliabilism, for enhancing rational decision making, represent potential protective gating mechanisms: These and other possible solutions 11, 14, 15, 18, 25, 26, 28, 30, 48, 49, 54, 61, 68, 87, 109, [114] [115] [116] [117] [118] [119] [120] are worthy of evidence-informed debate. Informed shared decision making is the critical cornerstone of patient safety. Hence, organizations and health care professionals involved in health care provision and delivery must invest time and effort to make shared decision making a reality. Additionally, the philosophy of shared decision making must become an integral element of health care education.
Failure to act will continue to "seriously impede" the "pursuit of greater safety," 15 especially in an era of increasing challenges to health care funding. 
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